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It has been suggested that much of the dramatic decline in the participation rate of Dutch elderly has been
caused by features of the Dutch retirement income support system.  The Dutch system consists of several
alternative schemes that can be used to retire early and these schemes are characterised by relatively weak
eligibility conditions and generous replacement rates.  This report assesses empirically the impact of the
incentives embedded in these schemes on the retirement behaviour of older workers using micro data.
The econometric model is estimated on a rich panel survey, specifically designed for ageing research.  The
results indicate strong incentive effects from Early Retirement schemes on the probability to retire.  We
also find that Disability Insurance replacement rates have a negative effect on the transition rate to Early
Retirement.  Early retirement replacement rates also affect the transition rates of the other exit routes.
This indicates that income streams of alternative exit routes are taken into account in the decision to retire
and that alternative exit routes act as substitutes, implying that changes in the regulations of one exit route
have an effect on the exit rate of the others.
******
Il a été suggéré que la baisse spectaculaire du taux de participation des personnes âgées aux Pays-Bas
s'expliquait essentiellement par des particularités du système de retraites néerlandais. Celui-ci offre une
gamme d'options alternatives qui pourraient être utilisées pour prendre une retraite anticipée et qui sont
caractèrisées par des conditions d'éligibilité relativement faibles et des taux de remplacement généreux. Ce
rapport évalue de manière empirique l'ampleur des effets incitatifs des institutions néerlandaises sur le
comportement vis-à-vis de la retraite en utilisant un modèle micro-économique. Ce modèle est estimé à
partir d'une enquête de panel étoffée, spécialement conçue pour la recherche sur le vieillissement. Les
résultats indiquent que les systèmes de retraite anticipés ont de forts effets incitatifs sur la probabilité de
prendre sa retraite. Nous constatons également que les taux de remplacement de la pension d'invalidité ont
un effet négatif sur le taux de transition vers la retraite anticipée. Les taux de remplacement de la retraite
anticipée ont aussi un impact sur les taux de transition d’autres voies de sortie. Ceci indique que les flux
de revenus des voies de sortie alternatives sont pris en compte dans la décision de prendre sa retraite et
que ces modes alternatifs agissent comme des substituts, ceci impliquant que des changements dans les
réglementations d'une voie de sortie ont des conséquences sur le taux de sortie des autres.
Copyright © OECD.  All rights reserved
Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all, or part of, this material should be made
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1. This report describes and analyses retirement patterns in the Netherlands.  Participation rates of
the elderly have declined substantially over the past two decades in most OECD countries.  This trend
towards earlier retirement has been particularly pronounced in the Netherlands.
2. From a micro-economic viewpoint, retirement can be seen as a decision regarding the optimal
age to stop working given the individuals environment and his/her relative preference for income and
leisure.  The individual environment is largely determined by the institutional setting.  The Dutch system
is characterised by the availability of a large number of 'exit routes'.  Early retirement schemes are
employer-provided programmes specifically designed to provide early retirement opportunities for elderly
workers.  Furthermore, though not designed for that purpose, in the past Unemployment Insurance and
Disability Insurance schemes have been used specifically as retirement schemes (see for instance Aarts &
de Jong (1990)).
3. The early retirement and social security programmes are characterised by relatively weak
eligibility conditions and generous replacement rates inducing individuals to retire early.  This may to a
large extend have accounted for the substantive drop in labour force participation rates.  There is however,
little empirical research on the size of the incentive effects of Dutch institutions on retirement behaviour.
4. The core of this report is the specification of a competing risk duration model.  Eligibility
conditions of the exit routes and replacement rates are explicitly incorporated into the model.  The model
is estimated on the Dutch CERRA (Centre for Economic Research on Retirement and Ageing) panel
survey, a survey specifically designed for research on ageing.  Estimates of the model can be useful in
assessing the relative importance of eligibility conditions and benefit replacement ratios in explaining
retirement behaviour.  Moreover, the model outcomes can be used as instruments in the evaluation of
policy changes.
5. The results indicate strong incentive effects from Early Retirement schemes on the probability to
retire.  We also find that Disability Insurance replacement rates have a negative effect on the transition
rate to Early Retirement schemes.  Early retirement replacement rates also affect the transition rates of the
other exit routes.  This indicates that indeed income streams of alternative exit routes are taken into
                                                     
1. Department of Economics, Free University and Economics Institute, Tilburg, The Netherlands.  Part of this
work was done while the author worked at the Centre for Economic Research for Retirement and Ageing
(CERRA) at Leiden University, the Netherlands.  The author would like to thank Stefano Scarpetta for his
valuable comments and suggestions.
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account in the decision to retire and that alternative exit routes act as substitutes, implying that changes in
the regulations of one exit route have an effect on the exit rate of the others.
6. The next section (Section 2) gives a brief description of Dutch Social Security and Early
Retirement schemes.  The dataset used in the analysis is briefly discussed in Section 3.  The empirical
analysis is presented in Section 4.  The analysis concerns a description of age and labour market status in
1993 and 1995, non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard rate over the years 1988 to 1995 and
estimation of a three-state competing risk model for individual retirement behaviour.  Section 5
summarises and concludes.
2. A brief introduction to the Dutch system
7. Dutch benefit programmes can be divided into Social Security benefit programmes and employer
provided Early Retirement programmes.  Social Security programmes consists of Unemployment
Insurance and Disability Insurance programmes.  In turn Unemployment Insurance (UI) programmes can
be divided into Unemployment Benefit (UB) programmes, to build a safety net to protect those who loose
their income due to involuntary unemployment, and social assistance (SA) provisions.
8. The UB entitlement period depends on previous job tenure and work experience and are
provided up to a maximum of 5 years.  Benefit replacement rates are a fixed percentage of previous
earnings and (roughly) 70 per cent of previous gross earnings.  Benefit recipients have to be in active
search for employment in order to maintain (full) benefits.  This requirement does not hold for recipients
of 57½ years and older.  Effectively this means that for a substantial number of elderly workers (those
with sufficient work experience) UB can be viewed as a pre-pension retirement income.  After exhaustion
of the UB entitlement period, the unemployed can apply for SA.  The drop in unemployment benefit levels
may be substantive as SA benefit are only 70 per cent of minimum wages (The gross minimum wage
amounted in 1994 to 2163,- Dutch guilders per month).  SA benefit is provided up to the mandatory
retirement age (65 years).
9. Disability Insurance (DI) is provided to protect those who have a physical and/or mental inability
to perform gainful employment.  Up to the summer of 1993, benefit levels were 70 per cent of gross
earnings and in practice were provided up to the mandatory retirement age.  In the past DI schemes were
specifically used as an exit route from the labour force.  It was even common that employers offered
elderly workers a bonus in addition to their social insurance income to make withdrawal from the labour
force more attractive. In the summer of 1993, DI regulations were changed to reduce the number of
beneficiaries.  The reform included making benefit levels a function of the duration of DI receipt and
medical examinations at regular intervals to verify that entitlement conditions still hold.  From 1993, the
length of the entitlement period for DI benefit at the rate of 70 per cent of gross earnings depends on age,
and ranges from 0 to 6 years.  After this initial period, benefits levels are lowered, the reduction depending
on previous wages, minimum wages and age.  (See Appendix II for details of the UI and DI benefit levels.)
For the present project, it has to be noted that the change in DI regulations hardly affected the DI
conditions for individuals aged over 45.
10. Early Retirement (ER) schemes, introduced in the late seventies, are employer provided schemes
and were initially designed as programmes to induce older workers to retire early in order to make place
for young unemployed workers.  ER replacement rates vary by sector or even by firms within sectors, but
are generally considered as financially attractive:  net replacement rates may in some cases be close to
100 per cent.  The average replacement rate is 80 per cent of previous gross earnings.  ER eligibility
conditions are typically dependent upon age and/or job tenure.
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11. Since 1957 all residents of The Netherlands have been entitled to flat rate social security benefits
at age 65.  The monthly benefit amount, like the universally guaranteed income program for younger
persons, is tied to the government mandated minimum wage.
12. Almost all workers can supplement these basic social security benefits with mandatory employer
pension benefits. Meuwissen (1993) estimates that 80 per cent of households with a head aged 65 and over
received some form of supplementary occupational pension in 1989.  Kapteyn and DeVos (1997) report
that almost all occupational pensions are defined benefit plans (usually basing benefits on some share of
final year's earnings) and that, together with social security benefits, they replace between 60 and 69 per
cent of the  median retiree's pre-tax earnings.
13. Outflow rates from the stock of non-working individuals to work appear to be extremely low for
the Dutch elderly.  As far as elderly UI an DI recipients are concerned, active search for (re)employment is
not required in order to maintain eligible for benefits, and ER recipients actually loose retirement benefits
upon re-entering employment.  Therefore the results of the competing risk model to be presented below
will turn out to be important in understanding low participation rates.  The model will moreover identify
policy instruments to reduce early withdrawal from the labour force.
3. Data
14. Data are obtained from the first two waves of the CERRA panel survey.  The CERRA panel
survey is a Dutch survey that is designed specifically for the analysis of health and retirement issues, and
resembles the well known Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) of the Michigan Survey Centre.  The first
wave dates from the fall of 1993 and consists of 4727 households in which the head of the household was
between 43 and 63 years of age at the date of the interview.  In each household both the head and partner,
if available, were interviewed.  Extensive information was obtained on labour market status, sources of
income, labour market history, housing, health and a variety of socio-economic variables.
15. In the fall of 1995 the same respondents were contacted for a second interview.  Approximately
74 per cent of the first wave respondents participated in the second wave, which resulted in about 3500
households.  The second wave primarily focused on the changes in labour market status, income, health
status and other socio-economic variables that might have occurred in the two year interval.
16. Internal evaluations of item non-response and representativeness of the first wave of data show
them to be of high quality.  In general, item non-response was not a problem.  Non-response was, however,
relatively high for the income questions, with a non-response rate of up to 30 per cent for some income
sources.  CERRA data was compared to data from The Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.  These
data were comparable based on age, sex, labour status, and education.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 The distribution across states at a point in time and Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard rate
out of employment.
17. The non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard rate out of employment of this section
are based on retrospective information over the period 1988 to 1993 of the 1993 wave.  In addition we
used information on labour force dynamics over the period 1993-1995 from the 1995 wave.  We included
all respondents aged 50 and above, as a significant part of the retirement from the labour force in the
ECO/WKP(98)20
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Netherlands takes place at ages close to 50.  More specifically, participation rates in 1990 of Dutch males
of 50 years and older was about 60 per cent.  For females the corresponding figure was about 20 per cent.
18. The exit states that we will consider in our analysis are: Disability Insurance (DI),
Unemployment Insurance (UI) and Early Retirement (ER).  The UI category includes all non-working
states other than DI and ER, such as out of the labour force, retirement because of mandatory retirement
and Unemployment Insurance.  A distinction of the separate modes of retirement within UI is not feasible
given the data at hand.
19. Table Ia and Ib present cross-tabulations of age and labour market status in our sample in 1993
and 1995.  From these tables it can be seen that participation rates start to decline at even very young ages.
At these younger ages Disability Insurance (DI) recipients account for the larger part of the non-
participation.  The fraction of individuals in UI and DI seems to increase with age, which mainly reflects
the absorbing nature of retirement in the Netherlands.  At ages of 60 and above Early Retirement becomes
the dominant mode for retirement.
20. The tables presented above provide a picture of retirement at a point in time, which is the result
of inflow in the states and average duration in the states.  As in practice retirement states are absorbing in
The Netherlands, it becomes particularly relevant to analysis inflow into non-participation.  Table IIa
provides Kaplan-Meier estimates of the transition rate of work to the non-work states ER, DI and UI.  The
table reports these transition rates for different age categories over the period 1988 to 1994.  It has to be
noted that transition rates for ages 58-61 for the years 1988-1990 are based on a small number of
observations.  This is due to the sample of the CERRA retirement survey (recall that the first wave
includes only respondents aged between 53-63 in 1993).  The same “data problems” obstructed us to
present Kaplan-Meier estimates for earlier years (i.e. years preceding 1988).  Furthermore, self employed
are excluded from the analysis.  Only 7 per cent of the original sample consists of self employed.  This
would be a too small sample to obtain reliable estimates.
21. From the table it can be seen that at early ages retirement is predominantly through DI and or UI.
ER transitions become large and dominant at more advanced ages, though this is well before age 60. Note
that UI and DI transition rates are slightly increasing over the ages, whereas ER transition rates increase
markedly at age 58.  Eligibility for most ER schemes is based on a function of age and tenure. Apparently
an increasing number of individuals meet the ER eligibility conditions at ages beyond 58. There does not
seem to be much variation in the transition rates over the period 1988-1994.  Finally, the results of
Table IIa are in line with the results of the cross-sectional information of Tables Ia and Ib: participation
rates of workers above age 60 are extremely low.  In Table IIb, we present Kaplan-Meier estimates of the
hazard rate for males.  The number of females in the sample did not allow for a separate analysis of female
transition rates by age and year.  Therefore conclusions about female transition rates should be obtained
from a comparison of Table II (males and females) with IIb (males only).  Table IIb is quite similar to
Table IIa, so that gender effects seem to be absent. It has to be noted however, that only heads of
households are included and that female heads of household may not be typical for the female population2.
22. The tables above provide information on average transition rates out of work.  They do not
provide us with information how these transition rates vary with different characteristics of the sample.
They, moreover, do not tell us why people retire and to what extend eligibility conditions and benefit
replacement rates determine the propensity to retire early.  The analysis of the next subsection deal with
this.
                                                     
2. The head is defined as the main income earner in the family.  Recall that female participation rates are
extremely low and that the typical picture in the Netherlands is that the man is the main income provider.
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4.2 Maximum Likelihood estimates of a competing risk model for transitions out of employment
23. The maximum likelihood estimates of the competing risk model are based on a smaller sample
than used above.  We restrict ourselves to respondents working in the fall of 1991.  The survey
information enables to accurately measure an individual's employment history up to that point and
subsequent labour force participation behaviour up to 1995.  We use the period 1991-1995 for estimation
as relatively reliable information on relevant regressors could be obtained for this time period This
concerns mainly time varying regressors such as sector of employment, marital status, health condition,
and, perhaps most importantly, ER eligibility conditions.  This would be more problematic for a larger
sample obtained from retrospective information.
24. We restrict ourselves to workers at a point in time (1991) to avoid sample selection problems
that are typical for stock sampled duration data.  More specifically, the duration distribution of previous
employment durations of non-working respondents in 1991 may be tedious to derive and estimate.
Expressions for stock sampled durations of a duration variable of interest can be obtained from, for
instance, Ridder (1984) and Lancaster (1990).  We use a likelihood based on the distribution of durations
beyond the selection date (1991), conditional on the elapsed duration (i.e. the duration elapsed up to the
selection date).  The expressions are tractable and the likelihood remains relatively easy to estimate.
25. Retirement behaviour of self-employed is expected to differ substantially from that of other
workers.  We only observe a few self-employed, so that these are excluded from the analysis.
26. The model acknowledges that some variables may not be constant over time; age, income and
ER eligibility indicators and benefit replacement rates being the most prominent ones.  The model
explicitly acknowledges eligibility rules for the alternative exit routes and the time varying nature of life
cycle income.  With respect to the latter, Burkhauser (1978) was the first to argue that not only current
income but also future income streams are important for the retirement decision.  In making individual
retirement decisions the present discounted value of income streams for alternative work and retirement
options should be compared.  In accordance with the (modern) retirement literature we follow this
approach.  So, we acknowledge that at different points in time different options are compared and that this
may govern the retirement decision.  This means that for this “option value” approach at income profiles
over an individual's remaining life cycle need to be generated at different points in time.
27. As far as wage income is concerned, we rely on analysis of Heyma (forthcoming).  He estimates
a simultaneous model for wage and labour force participation on panel information of the CERRA data
over the years 1991 to 1995.  The panel structure of the sample is used explicitly.  From the model
estimates of (remaining) life cycle income profiles can be derived for each respondents at different points
in time. These are used in the analysis.  Details of this model are provided in Appendix I.
28. Income streams for alternative retirement options are derived using ER eligibility rules and
social security rules.  ER eligibility conditions are typically a function of age and/or tenure.  ER
replacement rate are a fixed percentage of previous gross earnings.  Replacement rates and eligibility
conditions may differ by sector and even firms, they are negotiated over yearly by employer and employee
organisations and may therefore vary over time.  We observe the replacement rates in our sample.  Using
gross replacement rates and a simplified version of our tax system we constructed net replacement rates.
The average net replacement rate in 1991 was 83 per cent.
29. Furthermore DI/UI entitlement period depend upon age/tenure and benefit levels change after an




30. We assume in the analysis that DI and UI retirement routes, in contrast to ER schemes, are
always accessible to the individual.  For non-eligible workers the transition rate from work to ER is set to
zero.  More specifically the hazard rate out of work can be written as:
θ(t;Xt, Z, β) = θ DI(t;Xt, Z, βDI)  + θ  UI(t;Xt, Z, βUI)  +  IER(t) θ ER(t;Xt, Z, β ER)
IER(t) is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if an individual is eligible for ER at time t and zero
otherwise.  Xt and Z are vectors of time varying and time constant regressors, respectively.  The parameter
vectors associated with each of the exit rates are denoted by β k, k∈{ER,DI,UI}.
31. Other time varying covariates that are used in the analysis are calendar time effects and a
variable denoted as a “time-to-Early Retirement” variable.  The calendar time effect may reflect business-
cycle effects.  The “time-to-Early Retirement” variable is the time that individuals, who are not eligible for
an ER scheme, have to wait before they become eligible for ER benefits. Individual retirement decisions
are governed by income/leisure considerations and it may be conceivable that individuals choose a
financially less attractive option such as DI or UI, if eligibility for ER is at a remote date.  This variable
will only be relevant for the hazard rate from work to DI and UI.
32. As a consequence of the model formulation discussed above, the model captures the effect of
social security by using variations in benefits replacement rates and eligibility across individuals as well as
variations for an individual over time.  In addition, the model is estimated on a sample over the period
1991-1995.  So any behavioural effect of institutional changes in DI that may have occurred in 1993 is
accounted for, either by the calendar time effects or by the social security incentives effect.
33. Wealth is not included into the model. In the construction of the database it proved to be difficult
to obtain accurate results (there is a high non-response rate).  Moreover, less than 20 per cent of the
respondents in the total sample (i.e. the 4700 initially selected heads of households) indicated to have
financial assets.  This is in line with other Dutch results. It has been argued that there is little incentives to
hold financial assets due to the availability and the generosity of social security and pension system in the
Netherlands.
34. Duration is measured in months in the job that the individual held in October 1991. Age-specific
exit rates can be derived by taking the time varying age variable into account.  We return to the effect of
ageing below.  The competing risk model allows for duration dependence.  We take a step function of
duration with a single shift at 5 years.  More complex step-functions did not improve the estimation
results3.
35. Table A1 of Appendix III gives sample means of some explanatory variables that are used in the
analysis.  The maximum likelihood results of the competing risk model are presented in Table III. Th  first
column presents estimates of the transition rate from work to early retirement, the second column of the
transition rate from work to Disability Insurance, the third column of the transition rate from work to
Unemployment Insurance and other non-work states.  Positive coefficients are associated with high
transition rates, negative coefficient with low transition rates.
                                                     
3. Moreover, as calendar time, age , eligibility and “time-to-ER” are time varying regressors, a more refined
duration dependence patterns might be obstructed by identification problems.  With respect to this, the ER
eligibility indicator may become particularly relevant as in a large number of retirement schemes elapsed
duration is an important determinant of ER eligibility.
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36. The results for the first column indicate that only a limited set of variables seem to have a
significant impact on the ER transition rates.  These are the number of times out of the labour market, age,
the DI replacement rate and calendar time effects for the years 1993-1995.  The number of times that an
individual was out of the labour market could be seen as a proxy for the relative preference for leisure.  In
this way a positive coefficient would indicate that individuals with a high preference for leisure would
retire relatively early.  The age effect indicates that the propensity to retire increases with age.  For
instance, for a 50 year-old male the hazard equals about 0.34 (exp{-6.07 +0.10*50}.  The hazard rate of
this male increases with about 10.5 per cent per year due to ageing (this is from exp{0.10}=1.105).  The
duration patterns seem to imply that the transition rate to ER has increased after the changes in the DI
regulation of 1993.  The hazard increases structurally, which should be contrasted with the calendar time
effect of the transition rate to DI.  Indeed, this hazard rate seems to have decreased in 1993, though it has
to be noted that the coefficient is not significant at the 5 per cent level.
37. The DI replacement rate has a significant negative effect on the transition rate from work to
Early Retirement.  This seems to imply that income streams of alternative exit routes are indeed taken into
account on the decision to retire through ER.  There is no significant effect of the UI replacement rate.
From this it may be concluded that DI and ER schemes act as substitutes and that changes in the
regulations of one exit route have an effect on the exit rate of the other.
38. The ER replacement rate appears to have no effect.  This is a bit puzzling.  ER replacement rates
are very generous and from the data it can be seen that 583 out of the 2560 respondents retire through an
ER scheme in a 4 year time period.  This number is much larger than those for DI and UI. Furthermore, a
closer inspection of the total sample of ER recipients revealed that about 80 per cent retired directly
through ER at the moment that they became eligible for an ER scheme and that the remaining 20 per cent
retired within 1.5 years.  This would surely indicate that ER is a relative attractive option as a retirement
mode. It is conceivable, that the larger part of the income effect of the ER replacement rate is absorbed by
the eligibility indicator.  For non-eligible workers the transition rate is set to zero.  A way to test for this is
to ignore the eligibility indicator and to let the effect of eligibility and income be represented by the ER
replacement rate (which is zero for non-eligible workers).  Excerpts from the results are reported in
Table IV.  The results are strikingly different from the results of Table III.  The ER benefit replac ment
rate in Table IV has an extremely large effect and it appears that indeed ER schemes provide strong
incentives to retire early.  This strong effect was previously absorbed by the eligibility indicator.  Ignoring
the ER eligibility indicator also has a large effect on the DI benefit replacement rate and age.  The
likelihood worsens with 89 points.  A standard likelihood ratio test would strongly reject the restriction
that eligibility indicators play no role4.  From the results of Table III and Table IV it can be concluded that
conditions of the ER scheme play a very important role in the decision to retire early.  To state it
differently the results of Table IV illustrate that an ER benefit is apparently “an offer you can't refuse”.
39. The results of the second column of Table III indicate that indeed bad health is a major
determinant of the decision to retire through DI.  It has to be noted, however, that the health measure used
is a subjective indicator and that we included the health level of 1993 as an explanatory variable.  This
may blur the picture.  There is considerable literature on the effect of self-assessed health measures in
retirement models [see for example Bound (1991) and Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995)].  We furthermore
find strong effects of work experience and some effects of the ER replacement rate.  With respect to the
latter, higher ER benefit replacement rates lower the transition rate to DI.  Note, however, that this
                                                     
4. Strictly speaking, the eligibility indicator could be seen as a time varying variable with coefficient 1.  To be
more specific, if the hazard rate θ=exp{x'β}, then the eligibility indicator could be absorbed into the hazard
rate by specifying I * θ=exp{ log(I) + x'β}.  Ignoring the eligibility indicator is effectively the same as leaving
the variable log(I) from the specification.
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variable is not significant at the standard levels.  This may be due to the relatively small number of
observed transitions into DI.  DI replacement rates do not have significant effects on the transition into DI.
40. The UI transition regression results signal significant effects of health, industry, times out of the
labour force, house owners and ER replacement rates.  With respect to the income variables, the ER
variable indicates that high ER benefit replacement rates induce people not to retire through UI.  The
effect of the DI replacement rate is a bit surprising.  The coefficient suggests higher UI hazard rates for
individuals with high DI replacement rates.  Moreover, the UI replacement rate has the wrong sign.  It may
be that it proves to be difficult to separate the effects of UI and DI replacement rates.  We refer to
Appendix II for details on the UI and DI replacement rates.
41. Duration dependence only plays a role for the transition rate from work to UI.  This is in line
with earlier results from a simplified duration model where time varying covariates are excluded.
4.3 Simulations with the model
42. In Tables V and VI we report results of simulations with the model.  The simulations are based
on 10000 randomly generated participation profiles, using the parameters of the duration distribution
reported in Table III.
43. The basecase is reported in Table V (i.e. we use the characteristics of the sample).  Note that this
distribution is close to the cross-section distribution of age and state for 1993, as reported in Table Ia.
Next we simulated a situation in which eligibility for ER is postponed with 2 years.  The results of this
simulation are reported in Table VI.  The table basically shows that there is quite a large effect on
retirement through ER.  Participation rates rise, but also a part of the retirement finds it way through the
alternative retirement routes (UI and DI).  The relative value of DI and UI change as ER becomes
accessible at a later date.  This induces individuals to retire through the alternative exit routes (UI and DI),
which shows that UI and DI act as substitutes for ER schemes.  This, consequently demonstrates that
policies that restrict ER opportunities need to be combined with restrictions on the alternative exit routes.
44. We also performed some extra simulations in which the replacement rates are reduced (results
not shown).  These simulations appeared to generate little effects.  As argued in the Section 4.2 there are
not much effects from the replacement rates and the larger part of the incentives effects seems to be
absorbed by the eligibility conditions.  Most people retire immediately once they become eligible for an
ER scheme and variations in the ER replacement rates do not add much to this.  This may be largely due to
the extremely generous replacement rates of most ER schemes.  Replacement rates of UI and DI
(calculated according the description in the paper) are on average 0.47 and 0.66, respectively.  This
contrasts largely with the average replacement rate of 0.83 for ER schemes.
5. Summary and conclusions
45. Participation rates of the Dutch elderly have declined dramatically over the past decades.  This
decline has been more drastic than in most other OECD countries.  The Dutch retirement income support
schemes provide a range of alternative options that could be used to retire early.  Moreover, early
retirement and social security programmes are characterised by relatively weak eligibility conditions and
generous replacement rates and it has been argued that this to a large extent may have accounted for the
substantive drop in labour force participation rates of older workers.  There is however, little empirical
research on the size of the incentive effects of Dutch institutions on Dutch retirement behaviour.  The
present study aimed at shedding some more light on this issue.
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46. To this end, we specified and estimated a competing risk duration model that explicitly took
eligibility conditions of the exit routes and replacement rates into account.  The model was estimated on
data from the Dutch CERRA (Centre for Economic Research on Retirement and Ageing) panel survey, a
survey specifically designed for ageing research.
47. The results indicate that early retirement schemes create strong incentives to early withdrawal
from the labour market.  We also found that Disability Insurance replacement rates have a negative effect
on the transition rate to Early Retirement.  Early retirement replacement rates also affect the transition
rates of the other exit routes.  This indicates that income streams of alternative exit routes are indeed taken
into account in deciding when to retire and that alternative exit routes act as substitutes, implying that
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Table Ia:  Cross tabulation of Age and labour market status in 1993
(per cent of total for each age)































































































































Source:  The CERRA database
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Table Ib:  Cross tabulation of age and labour market status in 1995.
(per cent of total for each age)
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Table III.  Maximum likelihood estimates of a competing risk model for the transition out of work.  States:   
Early retirement (ER), Disability Insurance (DI) scheme and Unemployment Insurance
and other states.
ER DI UI
(i) Time constant covariates
Constant -6.07 (1.6) -12.3 (2.9) -10.2 (4.9)
Female -0.32 (1.2) -0.60 (1.2) 0.07 (0.2)
Married 0.11 (0.6) -0.48 (1.1) -0.25 (0.9)
Educational level (-1.7) 0.05 (1.8) -0.05 (0.8) 0.03 (0.6)
White collar worker -0.13 (1.3) 0.04 (0.1) 0.02 (0.1)
Bad health (1) 0.09 (0.8) 3.05 (12.0) 0.62 (2.5)
Industry 0.2 (1.8) -0.29 (0.8) 0.66 (3.4)
Construction -0.06 (0.3) 0.56 (1.5) -0.32 (0.2)
Banking 0.14 (0.8) 0.62 (1.6) 0.06 (0.2)
# Times employed -0.05 (1.5) 0.04 (0.5) -0.05 (0.8)
# Times employed 0 (0.1) -0.01 (0.8) 0.01 (1.1)
# Times of  the Lab.F. 0.51 (6.3) 0.02 (1.6) -0.62 (2.7)
Work experience -0.04 (0.5) -0.5 (5.0) -0.09 (0.8)
House owner -0.14 (1.4) 0.09 (0.3) -0.61 (3.5)
Partner works -0.12 (1.1) 0 (0.0) -0.27 (1.3)
# Dependents in the household 0.05 (0.8) 0.03 (0.2) 0.02 (0.2)
Part-time (<21 hours a week) -0.34 (1.4) -0.21 (0.4) -0.15 (0.5)
(ii) Time varying covariates
Age in years 0.1 (2.7) 0.13 (3.1) 0.13 (4.5)
Log of net yearly income (3) -0.05 (0.3) -0.04 (0.2) -0.12 (1.5)
Replacement rate ER (4) 0.13 (0.2) -1.11 (1.5) -0.96 (2.1)
Replacement rate DI (5) -1.93 (4.2) -1.51 (1.3) 0.68 (1.9)
Replacement rate UI (6) 0.25 (0.4) 0.91 (0.9) -0.46 (1.2)
Time to early Retirement (2) - - 0.00 (0.1) 0.01 (1.1)
(iii) Calendar time effects
1992/1993 -0.1 (0.9) -0.22 (0.8) 0.38 (1.8)
1993/1994 0.47 (3.2) -0.67 (1.7) 0.11 (0.4)
1994/1995 0.54 (3.5) 0.05 (0.1) 0.19 (0.7)
(iv) Duration dependance
>5 years -0.35 (1.1) 0.52 (1.1) -1.09 (5.0)
=-Log Likelihood 17962.2 506.9 1088.2
# Transitions 583 77 158
# Observations 2560 2560 2560
Note:  t-statistics in parentheses
(1) Bad health is derived from the question "would your health limit you in your work".  The dummy variables
equals 1 if health problems are present.  
(2) Measured in years.  The variables equals zero in case an individual is eligible for ER benefits.
(3) In 1993 prices.
(4) Replacement rate in fractions of net wage earnings.
(5) DI benefit levels are 70% of previous earnings for a DI eligibility period.  The DI eligibility period depends on 
age and varies from 0 to 6 years.  After this period benefit levels are 70% of minimum wages plus (1.4*
(age-15)) % of the difference between previous gross earnings and the minimum wage.  The
replacement rate is derived as the ratio of the total amount of DI benefits that an individual would obtain
if he/she would remain in DI up to age 65 (mandatory retirement age) and the wage earnings from age
at 1991 up to age 65.
(6) The unemployment insurance benefit levels are 70% of previous gross earnings for a period of 6 months.
A benefit extension period can be obtained that depends upon the individuals work history.  The benefit
extension period ranges from 0 to 60 months.  After exhaustion of UI eligibility, benefit levels drop 
to 70% of the minimum wage.  The replacement rate is derived as the ratio of the total amount of DI
benefits that an individual would obtain if he/she would remain in DI up to age 65 (mandatory
retirement age) and the wage earnings from age at 1991 up to age 65.
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Table IV  Excerpts from a competing risk model where ER eligibility rules are ignored.
variable
----------------------------------------------------------
Age in years 0.15 (4.8)
Replacement rate ER 6.50 (22.8)
Replacement rate DI -2.36 (4.9)






Table V  Simulations with the model:  the base case.  Work, ER, DI and UI participation rates(1)
Age Work ER DI UI
51.000 0.750 0.001 0.121 0.127
52.000 0.731 0.003 0.129 0.137
53.000 0.709 0.004 0.139 0.148
54.000 0.689 0.006 0.147 0.158
55.000 0.653 0.016 0.158 0.174
56.000 0.621 0.023 0.166 0.190
57.000 0.577 0.046 0.174 0.202
58.000 0.514 0.084 0.186 0.216
59.000 0.441 0.136 0.192 0.231
60.000 0.333 0.226 0.198 0.244
61.000 0.228 0.315 0.204 0.254
62.000 0.155 0.376 0.207 0.262
63.000 0.113 0.408 0.211 0.268
64.000 0.093 0.420 0.215 0.272
(1) 1000 individual eligibility profiles for ER were generated using the age-eligibility
distribution in the sample.  Next, we calculated retirement probabilities for each of the
10000 drawings over the life cycle (these probabilities were generated using the 
parameters from the duration distribution in Table III).  For each individual we
subsequently compared the probability of retirement at a specific age with a (new)
drawing from a Uniform (0,1) distribution to decide whether the individual retired.
More specifically, we took the individual as retired at a specific age (a 1/0 decision)
if the retirement probability exceded the random drawing.  We moreover assumed that 
retirement was an absorbing state (i.e. once retired, individuals did not return to work).
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Table VI  Simulations with the model:  eligibility conditions for
ER restricted.  New eligibility age = old eligibility age + 2 years.
ER, DI and UI participation rates
Age Work ER DI UI
51.000 0.746 0.000 0.121 0.133
52.000 0.728 0.001 0.129 0.141
53.000 0.706 0.002 0.139 0.153
54.000 0.684 0.003 0.148 0.164
55.000 0.659 0.005 0.158 0.179
56.000 0.631 0.007 0.166 0.195
57.000 0.595 0.019 0.176 0.209
58.000 0.564 0.026 0.186 0.223
59.000 0.515 0.050 0.195 0.240
60.000 0.451 0.087 0.205 0.257
61.000 0.375 0.139 0.213 0.273
62.000 0.266 0.228 0.220 0.286
63.000 0.177 0.303 0.223 0.297
64.000 0.122 0.348 0.227 0.303
(1) 1000 individual eligibility profiles for ER were generated using the age-
distribution in the sample.  Next, ER eligibility was postponed by 2 years
We subsequently generated new participation profiles for each of the




Specification of the wage-participation model
The wage participation model is based on information about income and work status in 1991, 1993 and
1995. The following model is specified:
wit = Xitβ  +  αi  +  ε1it
I* it = Zitγδ +  γi  +  ε2it
Where X and Z  are vectors including both time varying and time constant covariates. α and γ are
unobserved individual effect and ε1 and ε2 are transitory shocks. The model is essentially a Roy model
where wages w are only observed if a latent construct I* it exceeds a certain threshold. The latent construct
is unobserved but instead we observe whether individuals are at work at time , Iit=1. It is assumed that
Iit=1 iff I
*
it >0 and that Iit=0 otherwise. The wage equation and participation equation are correlated
because both the unobserved time constant effects (α and γ) and the transitory shocks (ε1 and ε2) are
allowed to be correlated. It is assumed that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the transitory
shocks. More specifically,
Cov( ε1 , ε2 ) = ρe
Cov( α , γ ) = ρ
Cov( α , εk ) = 0 k=1,2
Cov( γ , εk ) = 0 k=1,2
Heyma takes a random effects approach to simultaneously estimate the wage-participation model. As a
consequence the model allows for self-selectivity effects that may underlie the observed income and
labour market status combinations. The model incorporates time-varying variables like business cycle





Replacement rates in disability and unemployment insurance schemes
DI benefit levels are 70% of previous earnings for a DI eligibility period. The DI eligibility  period
depends on age and varies from 0 to 6 years. After this period benefit levels are 70% of minimum wages
plus (1.4*(age-15)) % of the difference between previous gross earnings and the minimum wage. The
replacement rate is derived as the ratio of the total amount of DI benefits that an individual would obtain if
he/she would remain in DI up to age 65 (mandatory retirement age) and the wage earnings from age at
1991 up to age 65.  More specifically,
0.7* wt* DI entitlement period  + DI Supplement
DI rate= --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sum of wt to time at which the individual becomes 65
DI supplement = 0.7*minwage + 0.014*(aget  - 15)*(wt-minwage)*(65-aget-DI entitlement period)
Of course the supplement is only provided in case the individual has not reached the age of 65 (the
mandatory retirement age) after exhaustion of initial DI entitlement.
The unemployment insurance benefit levels are 70 % of previous gross earnings for a period of 6 months.
A benefit extension period can be obtained that depends upon the individuals work history. The benefit
extension period ranges from 0 to 60 months. After exhaustion of UI eligibility, benefit levels drop to 70%
of the minimum wage. The replacement rate is derived as the ratio of the total amount of DI benefits that
an individual would obtain if he/she would remain in DI up to age 65 (mandatory retirement age) and the
wage earnings from age at 1991 up to age 65. More specifically,
0.7* wt* UI entitl. period + 0.7*minwage*(65-aget-UI entitl. period)
UI rate= ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





Table A1.  Sample descriptives
Variables Mean
Female (1/0) 0.1
Bad health (1/0) 0.8
Age in years 54
Married 0.86
Education (1-7) 3.62
White collar (1/0) 0.59
House owner 0.63
Partner works 0.29
ER replacement rate 0.83
Net yearly wage in 1991 ('000) 43.24
Fraction of censored cases 0.68
Elapsed time 1991 job up to 1991 (months) 228
Time from 1991 onwards (35) 35
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